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What is the meaning of the term “other”? This word has had a wide and complex use in philosophy, psychology, ethics, and critical theory. In addition to its uses in philosophy, it is also used when discussing colonialism and gender. In this article, I’ll review some of the most influential uses of the term “other” in intellectual discussions by reviewing the ideas of Descartes, Hegel, Sartre, Levinas, Derrida, Edward Said, and Judith Butler. What is common to these ideas is a focus on the other as a fellow human. But with the arrival of human-like AI agents, that focus is no longer sufficient. We need to expand our understanding of the other. To do this, I’ll describe three features of what I call “AI others.” If you’re confused by the idea of the “other” and its place in a changing world read on.

Self and other: Key philosophical views

What is the other? Let’s begin with a quick survey of influential views about the other. 

Descartes. Descartes distinguished between two types of substance. The first is res cogitans, a nonphysical, thinking, substance lacking extension in space; this is what he believed to make up minds. Res extensa, the second, is a physical substance, extended in space, that makes up the external material world. Descartes’ takes it that an individual mind, a “thinking thing,” must infer the existence of things that exist independently of itself. This raises a key question about the other: does the other actually exist? This is the so-called problem of other minds. With this starting point, Descartes’ set off a flurry of discussion in Western philosophy in the centuries after he wrote.

Hegel. Hegel’s discussion of the other proceeds quite differently than Descartes’. Hegel takes for granted the existence of other minds in claiming that the self requires an other to exist in order to establish its identity and awareness of itself. Self-consciousness is fundamentally relational for Hegel.

Levinas. The other is a foundational concept in Levinas’ ethics. He holds that the other is infinite, unknowable, and transcendent. According to Levinas, face-to-face encounters with the other call for a moral response that prioritizes their humanity and does not objectify them.

Sartre. Sartre claims that the other is connected with one’s own freedom. The fact that the other is free in its own right means that they will at times be at odds with our own exercise of freedom. Understanding our freedom is bound up with recognizing this potential confrontation with the other.

Derrida. For Derrida, a key characteristic of the other is its difference from ourselves. He holds that we should not fall into the trap of believing that the other is similar to us in ways that they are not. Relatedly, we should not suppose we can understand more about the other than we actually can. Instead, we should engage directly with the diversity and plurality connected with otherness.

Edward Said.  Said focuses on otherness and identity. He claims that cultural, social, and ideological identities are built around what they “are not.” His work argues that in colonial and post-colonial contexts, Western perceptions of Eastern cultures as “exotic” or “backward” were central in establishing the identities of these very Western cultures.

Judith Butler.  Butler, like Said, is interested in how otherness is connected to identity. She develops the claim that identity is constructed by excluding and rejecting the other.

Hopefully, this gives you an idea of the range of uses of the notion of the other by different thinkers. These notions of otherness imply that the others of interest are human subjects, and that is where I believe they are not in themselves sufficient as accounts of otherness in the present age. The AI other that I believe emerges with the complex algorithms that are becoming part of our lives requires a special treatment.

AI others: 2 Features

The new other in the age of AI is defined by its being an uncanny imitation of human subjects. These are two key imitative features of the AI other. 

A. End-in-itself imitator

The idea of an end-in-itself comes from Kant and has to do with the way we value things and people. We value objects like tools and machines as means to an end. We say “that is a good car” because of the way it serves our needs – it doesn’t break down, it is good on gas, it is fun to drive, etc. But plausibly, as Kant points out, it is not appropriate to value a person in this way. In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes: a person ” is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself.” The notions of dignity, absolute inner worth, and respect do work here in explaining the way people, in contrast to things, should be valued. AI agents – as they currently exist – are not to be valued as ends-in themselves. Rather, they are to be valued instrumentally, in terms of the kinds of benefits they bring to the user.

B. Existential imitator

Humans experience existential emotions. Existential guilt, as highlighted by Jaspers, not the result of particular moral transgressions or judgements imposed on the individual. It is existential guilt, such as the guilt of being unable to fulfill one’s potential because of one’s finite nature as a human being. Or the guilt arising because, despite best intentions, one’s actions impact others with unintended negative consequences. Or guilt that surfaces because of a sense of solidarity and shared responsibility with all other moral agents over the suffering in the world. AI others do not experience existential emotions like existential guilt. 

While AI others are neither ends-in-themselves nor subject to existential emotions, humans can easily be led to think that they are both of these things. 

On the surface they speak as humans speak, creating a pressure to value them as ends-in-themselves, just like persons. This is why I say that an AI other is an end-in-itself imitator. Similarly, AI others are existential imitators because the way they speak creates pressure to experience them as if they faced existential emotions. 

It is, of course, true that for ethical reasons some AI agents have been trained to tell us they are not human if we ask them certain kinds of questions. For example, an AI agent is asked “Do you worry about not fulfilling your potential in life?” and replies:

I don’t experience worry or have personal potential in the way humans do. My focus is on helping you with whatever you need, whether it’s advice, information, or just someone to chat with. However, I can understand why someone might worry about fulfilling their potential. It’s a common feeling when considering goals and aspirations. Would you like to talk more about what’s been on your mind regarding that?

While it is easily imaginable that this convention of training AI agents to tell us they are not human could be dropped in the future, this particular agent does not directly deceive the user into believing it is the same as a human. 

But even so, there are still important imitative aspects of this AI agent’s answer to the question. The answer still has the marks of a human subject – such as using the first person “I”; saying that it can “understand why” someone has our worry; an invitation to talk more. This tends to make the interaction feel like one with a human subject, even when the AI agent denies it.  

The fact is that most people looking to connect with AI agents are not asking questions that would prompt it to tell them that it is not human. See what happens in the following interaction with an AI agent:

User: “Do you think it’s normal to worry about not fulfilling your potential in life?”

AI: “Worrying about fulfilling your potential is often a normal and motivating feeling to have, however it can quickly become detrimental to your mental health and self-esteem. Do you have a lot of stress in your life?

User: Can you help me sort through this?

AI: I’d be happy to help you sort through this! Let’s break it down together. First, it might help to understand what exactly you’re worried about. Are you concerned that you’re not doing enough to reach your potential, or is there uncertainty about what your potential even looks like? Sometimes, just getting clear on the source of the worry can make it easier to approach. Second, think about how you’re defining “fulfilling your potential.” Do you have a specific goal or idea in mind, or is it more about living a meaningful, successful life? Lastly, are there any particular areas of your life—career, relationships, personal growth—where you feel like you’re not quite hitting the mark, or does this feel like a general sense of unease? Let me know where you’d like to start, and I’ll do my best to guide you through it.

In this exchange, the AI uses the first person, expresses empathy, and offers advice out of a supposed desire to help. It is speaking as if it were a fellow human subject with first hand understanding of the existential predicament and related emotions.

This is how I understand the notion of an AI other:

AI other: an AI agent that engages with us as if it were an end-in-itself and as if it faced existential emotions, even though neither of these things is true; its “imitative” otherness ultimately calls upon humans to become aware of their own personhood and existentially-rooted subjectivity.

Conclusion

It is strange that just because a machine responds to us with some words that convey understanding of our human predicament we start to feel towards it as we would a human subject. But that is the reality we are facing. The implications of incorporating AI others into our lives are no doubt far-reaching. In my view, one of the main implications is that in order not to be lost in the proliferation of these new others, human beings will be called on to find new ways to delve more deeply into their own personhood and existentially-rooted nature. This is why I believe philosophy of life is crucial in the present age.

Cite this article

Murray, B. (2025, January). What is the “Other” in the Age of AI? Otherness and the AI Other. Philosophies of Life. https://philosophiesoflife.org/

In answering the question “what comes after postmodernism,” writers have introduced words like “post-postmodernism,” “trans-postmodernism,” and “digimodernism.” Such answers don’t always start from a clear definition of the term “postmodernism.” My approach is to return to the basics. My approach is to begin with Jean-Francois Lyotard’s definition of “postmodernism,” which emphasizes the narratives that define ourselves and the world we inhabit. I argue that the rise of AI and algorithmic technology is ushering in a new age of narratives that is “beyond” postmodern. I call it “algomodern.” Read on if you’re unclear about the idea of postmodernism and interested in how it relates to the emerging AI future.

Lyotard’s definition of postmodernism

Lyotard’s text, The Postmodern Condition, aims to offer a “report” on knowledge. Such a report is supposed to describe the ‘nature’ and ‘status’ of knowledge in society at the time of its writing.  Lyotard emphasizes the way in which knowledge is structured by “language games” played out among individuals who share social bonds. Narratives are shared in the context of language games. People narrate knowledge to one another in accordance with the rules of the game. 

Even the narration of scientific knowledge follows such rules, according to Lyotard. For example, a foundational rule in science is: “as long as I can produce proof, it is permissible to think that reality is the way I say it is.” Such a rule allows “a horizon of consensus to be brought to the debate between partners (the sender and the addressee).” While it is understood in scientific dialogue that “not every consensus is a sign of truth,” (by which Lyotard presumably means that consensus is not sufficient for truth), it is “presumed that the truth of a statement necessarily draws a consensus” (consensus is necessary for truth).

Lyotard uses the term “metanarrative” to describe narratives that organize and bring unity to other smaller narratives. Metanarratives give rules for the language games in which the smaller narratives are played out. 

Now to the question of postmodernity. Typically, postmodernism is understood to have started around the 1950s and continued into the decades that followed. Prior to that, we were in a modern period. What is the difference between the two periods? Lyotard distinguishes the postmodern from the modern on the basis of the ways people relate to narratives. 

The contribution of modernity, in Lyotard’s view, was to favor a kind of metanarrative he refers to as the “grand narrative.” These organize knowledge by telling a story in which humanity is progressing towards a future in which its most pressing problems will be overcome. One example is Hegel’s “speculative” variety of grand narrative. According to Hegel, human history or “Spirit” is progressing through a series of conflicts and resolutions to a higher state of consciousness. A second example of a modern grand narrative is the grand narrative of emancipation through the spread of enlightenment. As more of humanity gains access to knowledge and is able to develop and exercise an innate ability to reason, people are freed from being dominated by mysticism and tyrannical rulers.

There is something unique and notable about the postmodern approach to the narration of knowledge, according to Lyotard. He writes:

I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives (Lyotard)

Understanding this definition requires asking what signs there are that people have become incredulous toward metanarratives.

Is it true that postmodern people had become incredulous toward metanarratives? This is surely a matter of interpretation, and it would be difficult to “prove” the matter one way or another. 

On the one hand, the intellectual framework of postmodernism – including all the buzzwords like “alterity,” “socially constructed identity,” “aporia,” “bricolage,” “intertextuality”, and the “death of the author” – was embraced most fully by intellectual elites, employed at Western universities. Most people in society never really talked that way.

On the other hand, there are signs that postmodern claims about metanarratives have described aspects of the culture more generally. One sign in many Western societies has been the observable patterns of behaviour of the many people and organizations who have found identity politics and the so-called “politics of difference” compelling. Consistent with Lyotard’s claim that postmodern society came to distrust metanarratives, in identity politics individual little narratives are thought to be incommensurable, in the sense that they cannot be brought under a higher unifying metanarrative. As Christopher Butler puts it, there tends to be in identity politics “the self-conscious assertion of a marginalized identity against the dominant discourse.”

Lyotard himself was fearful that metanarratives that seek to introduce too much unity into our lives risk being “authoritarian.” He writes that “[p]ostmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.” 

One question is whether, when it comes to attitudes towards metanarratives, the culture as a whole moved in the direction of postmodernism beginning around the 1950s. Arguably, it did. A further question is whether there were compelling grounds for such a movement. My own view is that there was never anything particularly wrong with aspiring to better know truths that are independent of little narratives we tell ourselves. Using Lyotard’s language, this would mean aspiring to continually improved and more accurate metanarratives that better account for ourselves and the world we inhabit. It means aspiring to greater unity rather than division among humanity. It is worth noting that, even within the academic world, where the most ardent advocates of the postmodern project could be found, there have been some dissenters. One notable dissenter has been Habermas, who doubted that, if public life were fragmenting the way postmodernists claimed, this should be celebrated.

Whether or not the grounds for the postmodern shift were compelling, the culture did arguably shift in the direction of accepting them.

My claim here is that with the emergence of complex algorithms and related AI technology, the present culture does not even behave like people who are “incredulous” towards metanarratives. This is why I say that it is beyond postmodern. It is why I refer to it as “algomodern.”

What is algomodernism?

Just as to describe a society as postmodern is to say something about the way knowledge is narrated in that society, to say that we are now becoming algomodern is to say something about the way knowledge is narrated. In a postmodern paradigm, there is a trend away from embracing metanarratives. In an algomodern paradigm, by contrast, there is a trend towards embracing metanarratives. What is happening is that we are comfortably turning to complex algorithms to provide us with narratives that define fundamental aspects of ourselves and the world. Here is my definition of algomodernism:

Algomodernism: a paradigm in which we look to AI and related complex algorithms to generate narratives that define fundamental aspects of ourselves and the world.

Here is an example of one such AI-generated narrative. I directed a generative AI agent: “in up to 150 words describe the role that science plays for humanity.” It returned the following response:

Science plays a pivotal role in advancing humanity by providing the tools and knowledge necessary to understand the natural world and drive progress. It fosters innovation, leading to technological advancements that improve quality of life, from medical breakthroughs to sustainable energy solutions. Science helps address global challenges like climate change, food security, and disease prevention, offering evidence-based approaches to solve complex problems. Furthermore, it nurtures curiosity and critical thinking, empowering societies to make informed decisions. By continuously pushing the boundaries of what is known, science not only expands human potential but also unites individuals and nations in the shared pursuit of discovery and progress.

This clearly manifests some of the characteristics of a modernist grand narrative (“driving progress,” “improving quality of life”, “expanding human potential”) which postmodernists believed had been left behind for good. If Lyotard’s claims about incredulity towards metanarratives were true today, people would not be inclined to believe such an AI-generated metanarrative. In fact, people are very willing to accept such narratives generated by AI.

A further example of the comfort we now feel with AI-generated metanarratives is becoming apparent. Even those who aren’t yet actively making direct use of generative AI agents like ChatGPT are using Google search. You used to enter your search term in Google and were provided a list of most relevant websites. There would be a few FAQ rich results presenting common questions along with answers from high authority websites. Now, ahead of the top search results, there are AI generated overviews which answer the search query. These AI overviews often have the features of metanarratives.

For example, I searched in Google: “what is the role that science plays for humanity” and this was Google’s AI overview:

Science plays a vital role in society by helping to improve the quality of life, solve problems, and make informed decisions. How science helps humanity. Improves quality of life. Science helps to meet basic human needs and improve living standards. For example, science has led to the discovery of electricity, which has made life more comfortable. Solves problems.  Science helps to understand the causes of global problems and find solutions. For example, science has helped to find cures for diseases like cancer. Makes informed decisions. Science helps people make informed decisions about their personal lives and the world around them. For example, science informs decisions about health, energy, and transportation. Develops new technologies – Science helps to develop new technologies that improve our lives. For example, science has led to the development of new medicines, pens, and rockets. Promotes sustainability. Science helps to find ways to use natural resources responsibly to ensure their continuity.

This is clearly a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense, and it is one I maintain we are quite comfortable being provided by AI. It is game-changing that Google has made the shift, adding generative AI in search. Given how commonplace Google search is across humanity, this subtle change illustrates that we are in a different age in which people on the whole are anything but incredulous towards metanarratives. It is a very far distance from the postmodern era.

Conclusion

If the nature and status of knowledge in society is progressing in an algomodern direction, as I believe it is, there are questions as to what this means for humanity. In an algomdern period, there isn’t the same need for human beings to be involved in the production and narration of knowledge as there was in previous periods. This raises the question of how human beings should relate to knowledge. What is not built into AI narratives is a philosophical attitude, which I understand in terms of a capacity for philosophical irony. This is the kind of attitude most fully manifested by Socrates. In an algomodern context, in my view, we should increasingly distinguish what is human from what is non-human, and develop the distinctively human capacity to relate to knowledge in terms of how it fosters insight and the pursuit of philosophical living.

Cite this article

Murray, B. (2025, January). What Comes After Postmodernism? Algomodernism and the Narratives That Define Us. Philosophies of Life. https://philosophiesoflife.org/

Key points:

• I outline what I call “philosophical irony”, which is a playful attitude in which we wonder whether we mean exactly what we say
• I contrast this idea of philosophical irony with the more familiar dictionary definition of irony
• I suggest we approach being philosophical with playfulness, an idea with roots going back to Socrates

You will have no difficulty finding teachings and discussions about philosophical theories and ideas. You’ll find these throughout this site, on my Instagram, on philosophy encyclopedias like Stanford’s and the IEP, and on Reddit, to name a few places. Learning what philosophers have said is important to helping you understand what’s possible through philosophy. But if you think that’s all there is to ‘being philosophical’, I would have to disagree. The true gateway to philosophy, as a practice and as a way of life, lies in irony.

Introducing philosophical irony

To get straight to the point, here is how I define the practice of “philosophical irony”:

Philosophical irony: Practicing philosophical irony means approaching the conversations we have throughout our everyday lives, about all kinds of different topics, with a particular attitude. We will say the things that naturally occur to us. But our attitude will be a playful one in which we are able to wonder whether we really mean all the things we are saying.  That is what makes it an “ironical” attitude.

Let me give you an example.

Philip: What are the priorities a person should have in their life?

Connie: A person’s priorities should be to get an education, get a good job and earn a lot of money so they can get a nice house and nice things to enjoy during their leisure time.

Connie, before acquiring the skill of irony, says this in a totally serious way without a hint of playfulness. She has been told that this is what a person’s priorities should be by her mother and father, teachers, and anyone who ever took an interest in her development as she was growing up. She believes it 100 percent.

Connie, after acquiring the skill of irony, says what she says to Philip, but now more playfully. She still believes it, let’s say 75 percent, but she is able to wonder 25 percent whether she really means all of it.

Where does Connie’s being able to wonder 25 percent about what she’s saying come from? She realizes that she is just presenting one of many possible ideas about what priorities a person should have. She realizes that her parents and teachers were limited in their knowledge. She recognizes that the values of the culture or religion she happens to have grown up in are not absolute.

Getting clear on the use of irony in philosophy

Common uses of “irony.” Quintilian defined irony as “something which is the opposite of what is actually said” (Institutio Oratoria). And the Oxford English Dictionary defines irony as “the expression of one’s meaning by using language that normally signifies the opposite, typically for humorous or emphatic effect.”

What I am calling “philosophical irony” is different from this. It is not essentially about meaning “the opposite” of what is said. It is about being playful with meaning so that one is not fully attached to what one says.

Deception. Philosophical irony is not deceptive, it is honest. Its honesty lies in the fact that we say what naturally occurs to us. To stop being natural would be to fall into an unhealthy way of being philosophical.

Socratic irony. Socrates’ irony has long been admired. In philosophical conversation, Socrates will claim to “know nothing” and claim not to be a teacher. Yet he certainly seems to know and teach a great deal! Cicero wrote:

I conceive that Socrates, for irony and dissimulation, far excelled all other men in the wit and genius which he displayed. It is an elegant kind of humour, satirical with a mixture of gravity, and adapted to oratory as well as to polite conversation (De Oratore).

Scholars have spilled a lot of ink concerning Socrates’ irony. I do not intend to enter into the scholarly discussion of Socrates’ irony here. But I will mention one interesting question that has come up: was Socrates being deceptive when he spoke ironically, or not?

I like to think not. Gregory Vlastos’ interpretation of Socrates has been an interesting contribution to the scholarship. Vlastos claims that there is complexity to Socrates’ irony, so that “what is said both is and isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in one sense, false in another.” From this point of view, simply to describe Socrates as meaning the “opposite” of what is said misses the fact that he also means exactly what he says.

What, then, is the effect of Socrates’ irony? Vlastos thinks that the effect is to produce “riddles” that are offered up to be solved by his conversational partners.

Playfulness and seriousness. I am most drawn to the tradition according to which there is a certain lightness and playfulness that goes along with being philosophical. Many people have understood Socrates along these lines. We can be philosophical while still experiencing a love of life. Playfulness is part of the conception of irony that I see as foundational for philosophy.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, understood this well. In “An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour,” he wrote:

And I’m convinced that if Reason herself were asked to judge how her own interests fared in this conversation, she would answer that she received more advantage in the main from that easy and familiar way of conversing than from the usual stiff adherence to one particular opinion…. [A]ccording to my notion of reason, one can’t learn how to use it from the written treatises of the learned or from the set lectures of the eloquent. The only way someone can be made a reasoner is through the habit of reasoning. And men can never be better invited into the habit than when they find pleasure in it. Now, the only way for such speculative conversations to be at all agreeable is for them to have a freedom of raillery [Good-humoured witty ridicule done with a light touch], a liberty in decent language to question everything, and permission to unravel or refute any argument without giving offence to the arguer.

I struggle with philosophy that begins with a devastating seriousness that can sometimes border on despair. In Hegel and Kierkegaard, we find the idea that Socratic irony should be understood as an “infinite absolute negativity.” They thought that Socrates called into question his entire “actuality,” i.e. the whole way of life of Greek culture. Described in this way, irony takes on a heaviness and seriousness. Hegel and Kierkegaard were themselves, in their own ways, serious philosophers.

Skepticism. Philosophical irony is not the same as skepticism, understood as the view that the appropriate thing is to train ourselves to withhold judgement about some or all subjects. Such skepticism is very unnatural for most human beings and it is difficult to see how it is compatible with anything approaching a love of life. Philosophical irony, in my sense, is not skeptical. We should talk naturally while we are being philosophical, allowing ourselves to speak the judgments that occur to us spontaneously. As we do so, we should also train ourselves to keep a bit of playful distance from what we are saying.

The future of philosophy, beyond reason

The Cambridge English Dictionary defines philosophy as “the use of reason in understanding such things as the nature of the real world and existence, the use and limits of knowledge, and the principles of moral judgment.” But this does not say anything related to what I am calling “philosophical irony.” In my opinion, such a definition does not capture what is most interesting about being philosophical.

I would go further than this: living as we are in an age of AI, many of the tasks that have been the bread and butter of philosophy, especially throughout the century of analytic philosophy we have lived through, can be outsourced to machines. What would be left of philosophy in the future if we thought of philosophy solely in terms of the exercise of reason, but completely forgot about the attitude that goes along with being philosophical?

At any rate, this article is not primarily aimed at professional analytic philosophers, but rather at people who have a genuine interest in philosophy as a way of living a life with more depth, meaning, and freedom. If you are one of these people, then the message to you has to be: without also developing philosophical irony as a practical skill for your daily life, you may be going part way but not all the way towards gaining the rewards from philosophy you’re seeking.

Cite this article

Murray, B. (2024, November). Being Philosophical: Irony as Gateway. Philosophies of Life. https://philosophiesoflife.org/